Abstract. Quine's classic interpretation succinctly characterized Carnap's Aufbau as an attempt "to account for the external world as a logical construct of sense-data ... ."
I. Introduction
The Aufbau was once described as an attempt "to account for the external world as a logical construct of sense-data" (Quine 1969, 74) . Consequently, the most important influence on the Aufbau could be precisely named as "Russell". Those times have passed. The task of providing a balanced and comprehensive interpretation of the Aufbau has turned out to be more difficult than most people imagined forty years ago, when Quine's interpretation of the Aufbau was popular.
It is my thesis that the original core of the Aufbau project rested on a problem that had haunted German philosophy since the end of the 19th century. In terms fashionable at the time, the problem was characterized as a polarity between Leben and Geist (Life and Spirit). It became particularly acute in the turbulent years of the Weimar Republic, when neo-Kantianism, still arguably the leading current of academic philosophy in Germany at the time, came under heavy fire from various currents of Lebensphilosophie (philosophy of life) and related philosophical currents such as Heidegger's fundamental ontology. 1 Carnap, one of the younger and more ambitious philosophers of the time, was also engaged in the project of overcoming the conflict between Leben and Geist. His attempts were characterized by a certain eclecticism; he frequently used conceptual devices and ideas from very different currents of science and philosophy. This eclecticism makes it difficult to identify the influences that contributed to the Aufbau.
The aim of this paper is to draw attention to three influences that have been neglected in the literature: Lebensphilosophie, South-West neo-Kantianism, and a specific version of Machian monism as presented by the German philosopher and psychologist Theodor Ziehen in his Erkenntnistheorie auf psychophysiologischer und physikalischer Grundlage (Ziehen (1913) , henceforth Erkenntnistheorie).
At first glance, these influences form a strange triad. Even if one were to admit that they had some influence on the Aufbau, it is not clear what brings them together. The answer is that all three theories are essential ingredients in the unpublished manuscript Vom Chaos zur Welt , RC 081-05-0, henceforth Chaos), which was, according to Carnap, the "germ of the Aufbau", or as I contend, Chaos may be characterized as the "Ur-Aufbau". The general thesis of this paper is that bringing into focus the triad of Lebensphilosophie, South-West neo-Kantianism, and monism á la Ziehen sheds new light on the meaning of Carnap's first opus magnum.
At that time, the situation in German philosophy might be described as a quarrel between academic, broadly scientific-minded philosophy on the one hand and more or 1 A succinct presentation of the philosophical landscape in Germany in the 1920s can be found in Schnädelbach (1984) .
less irrationalist currents such as Lebensphilosophie on the other. More precisely, the academic philosophy sought to confine the effect of the growing tide of Lebensphilosophie on the cultural and intellectual scene in Germany. 2 While Lebensphilosophie tended to assume an unbridgeable gap between Leben and Geist, most currents of established academic philosophy were prepared to recognize a relative independence and autonomy for the sphere of Leben. As discussed below, academic philosophers generally sought a reconciliation of Geist and Leben in a world in which both had a legitimate place.
Among the philosophers engaged in overcoming the antagonism between Geist and Leben were Cassirer (Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, 1923 Formen, -1929 , Rickert (System, 1921) , Vaihinger (Die Philosophie des Als Ob. Ein System der theoretischen, praktischen, und religiösen Fiktionen der Menschheit, 1920 6 ), and Husserl (The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (1936) and earlier lectures).
Carnap was aware of many of these works. It would not be unjustified to ascribe to his early work a certain eclecticism, as the exegetic work of several authors has revealed, Carnap used arguments from many different philosophical quarters. I will argue that this eclecticism was held together by the underlying aim of overcoming the antagonism between Leben and Geist.
The Aufbau project covered an extended period, from approximately 1922 to 1930.
3 It can hardly be expected that Carnap's philosophical convictions would remain constant throughout this entire period. I contend that in the early Aufbau project, Carnap sought a harmonious reconciliation of "Geist" and "Leben" in a meaningful world in which both 2 An impressive account of the fascination that Heidegger's lectures exerted on the German academic youth at that time is given by Hannah Arendt: " [His] name travelled all over Germany like the rumour of a secret king. [...] The rumour that attracted [the students] first to Freiburg to the Privatdozent and somewhat later to Marburg, told that there was one who really achieved the thing that Husserl had proclaimed" (Arendt (1969, 893) . The tone of many comments about
Heidegger's performance at the "Davoser Disputation" is similar. Many hailed him as the prophet of a new (philosophical) age. This prediction was fulfilled a few years later, but perhaps not in the way that many had hoped for (cf. Gordon (2010) , Wolin (2001 Wolin ( , 2006 ).
had a legitimate place. Over time, however, the project retreated to the more modest goal of providing a rational reconstruction of scientific knowledge, neatly separated from the realm of Leben, that allowed for the peaceful co-existence of Leben and Geist.
The two realms nevertheless remained related to each other in some manner, as expressed in the enigmatic closing phrase of the Manifesto: "The scientific world conception serves life and life receives it" (cf. Mormann (2013) ).
The outline of this paper is as follows. In section 2, the global situation of German philosophy in the Weimar Republic is characterized in broad terms as a polarized spectrum that ranged from scientifically oriented (neo-Kantian) philosophy to a group of loosely defined irrationalist, anti-scientific philosophical currents that may be subsumed under the heading of Lebensphilosophie. For the purposes of this paper , I
include various authors such as Bergson, Scheler, Spengler, Nietzsche, Simmel, Dilthey, and even Heidegger may be subsumed under this imprecise philosophical heading. For these thinkers in a rather woolly sense, Leben -in a not purely biological sense -was the primary and even the only important topic of philosophy in a way that transcended the purely biological sense.
When it emerged, most academic philosophy ignored Lebensphilosophie and its growing influence on the cultural and intellectual life of Germany. Eventually, however, it became clear that this stance was no longer tenable. Academic philosophy was forced to adopt a definitive attitude towards Lebensphilosophie that went beyond disregard or refusal.
For Carnap, one particularly important attempt to address the problem of Leben was put forward by the South-West neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert in his two books Die Philosophie des Lebens (Rickert 1920) and System System (1921) and Carnap's Chaos For instance, both conceptualize the "Aufbau" of an ordered rational world as emerging from a "chaos of Erlebnisse" and both describe the motif for such an "Aufbau" as a pseudo-Nietzschean "will to order" or "will to system". (Ziehen 1913) , certain requirements of Lebensphilosophie, and the conceptual tools of relational logic inaugurated by Russell and Whitehead. 4 What exactly this means will be clarified in the following sections.
In the longer, unpublished version of his Intellectual Autobiography Carnap characterized Chaos as "the germ of the Aufbau". He noted that in Chaos he formulated, for the first time, the constitutional method of "quasi-analysis" which played an essential role in the constitution theory überhaupt. This claim is in need of qualification. As shown in section 3, the essential ingredients for this theory can already be found in Ziehen's Erkenntnistheorie. II. Weimar Polarity.
Near the end of the Weimar Republic, one of its most influential philosophers and public intellectuals, Ernst Cassirer, offered the following diagnosis of the situation of philosophy in Germany:
4 Ziehen was the psychiatrist who took care of Nietzsche after he had a mental breakdown in 1889 and was admitted to psychiatric care.
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Again, it has become evident how strong our ""modern"" and most modern philosophical thoughts are rooted in romanticism and how they depend, consciously or unconsciously, on romanticist patterns. Again, the great anti-thesis of Natur and Geist, the polarity of Leben and Erkenntnis occupy center-stage in philosophical considerations 5 -and still the conceptual tools forged by romanticism, and the categories created by this period determine the problem and its solution. (Cassirer (1930, 186) ) 6 Cassirer noted that there are several ways to address this polarity. One was to dissolve it in favor of a unipolar approach. As paradigmatic examples of similarly one-sided strategies he considered, on the one hand, the irrationalist version of
Lebensphilosophie put forward by Ludwig Klages in his monumental Der Geist als
Widersacher der Seele (Klages (1929 (Klages ( -1933 . 1500 pages) and the radically physicalist versions of logical empiricism espoused by the Vienna Circle, on the other hand. While Klages considered Geist to be the deadly enemy of Leben, the logical empiricists considered everything that could not be expressed in physicalist language to be metaphysical nonsense.
In addition to these radical and one-sided proposals of overcoming the fundamental polarity, Cassirer took into consideration a quite different class of proposals, namely those that intended to bring about a reconciliation between Leben and Geist. It is not difficult to see that Cassirer favored such a solution when he put forward the rhetorical question:
Romanticism versus positivism; "reason and science" versus the opposition to both, even their contempt, mysticism vs. "physicalism" -this is the whole theme of the philosophy of the last 150 years (1781 -1931) . Do we have to subscribe to one of these alternatives -or is there a kind of "reconciliation" that is principally different from an eclectic mixture of these two ingredients? (Cassirer 1995, 131) The spectacular culmination of this confrontation between Lebensphilosophie and 5 Unwittingly, Carnap became a witness for the correctness of Cassirer's diagnosis as demonstrated by the fact that, some years later, Carnap published in the journal Natur und Geist (sic) the paper Theoretische Fragen und praktische Entscheidungen (Carnap 1934 Gründer (1988 ), Friedman (1999 , Gordon (2011 ), Skidelsky (2008 ). Many contemporary witnesses considered the encounter between Heidegger and Cassirer to be a major philosophical event, which amounted to a philosophical sea-change and defined a new philosophical era. The general impression was that Heidegger, representing the new way of doing philosophy, was the winner in the Davos showdown, although I do not discuss the assertion here.
For the purposes of this paper, it is important only to note that Carnap also participated in the Davos event and had discussions with both Heidegger and Cassirer (cf. Friedman (1999) , Gordon (2010) ). This suggests that he was vividly interested in the fundamental antagonism between the two currents that characterized philosophy in German-speaking countries and beyond at the time and that he was at pains to find his own stance in this dispute and overcome the aporetic controversy.
In this respect, he was one of the many philosophers of the time who were engaged in overcoming the aporetic polarity between irrational Leben and rational Geist. is not adequately translated as "The Logical Construction of the World".
A more recent attempt to embed Carnap's work in a specific historical and cultural context is the work of Gottfried Gabriel. (cf. Gabriel (2003 , 2004 ). According to Gabriel:
Carnap's early philosophy … can be regarded as a configuration of influences -a cross-fertilization of modern logic, neo-Kantian constitution theory, and the critique of metaphysics stemming from Lebensphilosophiehighly specific to a particular time and place: Jena in the first two decades of the twentieth century, when Carnap grew up and went to university there. (Gabriel (2004, 6) Gabriel's description of the cultural context from which Carnap's early philosophy emerged points to some interesting ingredients that have been neglected in the past.
Regrettably, he addresses the Aufbau only in passing and I would not place as strong an accent on "Jena" as he does. Rather, I contend that overcoming the aporetic antagonism between Lebensphilosophie and scientifically minded philosophy (in a broad sense) was not a special problem of the Jena philosophical configuration but an urgent problem for the entire field of academic philosophy in the Weimar Republic.
Instead of focusing on the concept of "Aufbau", as Galison did, I will concentrate on the concepts Erlebnis and Chaos, which point rather directly to the strong influence of Carnap's attack in Overcoming Metaphysics on Wertphilosophie was clearly directed against both Rickert and Heidegger. Eventually, in Carnap's later Intellectual Autobiography (Carnap 1963 ), Rickert was implicitly deemed philosophically irrelevant; he
was not mentioned at all. However, let us return for a moment to when Carnap appears to have held Rickert's philosophy in higher esteem, namely immediately after Rickert published System (Rickert 1920) and Philosophie des Lebens (1921) 7 . In these works, Rickert not only outlined his own philosophical system but also attempted to come to terms with Lebensphilosophie. He recognized the philosophical importance of the topic of Leben in general and of Erlebnis in particular:
Every systematic thought seeks to begin with something immediately given which does not permit any further derivation. Using a word fashionable today, this immediately given is called "the experience" ("das Erlebnis").
This need not to be objected. (System, 311).
Carnap's argument for choosing Erlebnisse as the basic elements of the constitutional system in the Aufbau was virtually identical to Rickert's:
...
[S]ince we wish to require of our constructional system that it should agree with the epistemic order of the objects ( §54), we have to proceed from that which is epistemically primary, that is to say, from the "given", i.e., from Erlebnisse themselves in their totality and undivided unity.
(Aufbau, § 67)
Rickert's assertion that he "didn't object" to calling "the given" "Erlebnis" was, he
hoped, a clever attempt to bring Leben -conceived of as a "stream of Erlebnisse" -back under the control of scientific philosophy. For this endeavor, he sought help from
Nietzsche, who may be considered a strange ally because he was one of the protagonists of Lebensphilosophie. According to Rickert, in the realm of philosophy, the Nietzschean "will to power" expresses itself as a "will to the system":
What we immediately "experience" ("erleben"), is, after having subtracted all conceptualizations a completely disordered turmoil of impressions that constantly change [...] . For a scientifically minded individual, the world, thought as totally unsystematic, is a ... chaos. Most people do not realize this fully due the fact that from birth on we encroach in a stable organization of the world (Rickert 1920, 6/7) ...
Hence, the will for the philosophical consideration of the world is necessarily connected with the will to the system. (ibid. 10) (my emphasis, TM)
Philosophy has to think the world in such a way that from the chaos of
Erlebnisse a kosmos arises that is ordered and articulated by principles (ibid., 50).
Like Rickert, Carnap assumed, in Chaos, that the "chaos" from which the fictitious
Aufbau of Wirklichkeit was to emerge was minimally structured so that the "will to order" had a base from which to begin the construction process:
The chaos does not contain identical elements that can be grasped as isolated ones. In order that the chaos can be ordered at all, there must nevertheless exist differences in it on which it depends which places of the ordering schema are related to which parts of the chaos. This process will be discussed in detail in the next section.
Both Rickert and Carnap sought to design a constitution theory that could be used as a frame for constructing an ordered and meaningful world that retained at least some of the features characteristic of the world propagated by philosophers of Lebens. This is the germ of the constitution theory of the "Log. Aufbau!" 10 This is virtually the only quotation from Chaos of which commentators take note. 11 As I want to show that Chaos contains more than this one line that may be useful in elucidating some intricate interpretative issues in the Aufbau .
8 A similar argument -that an antagonistic clash between Leben and Geist as advocated by
Klages and his partisans is inconsistent -can also be found in Cassirer (1995) .
9 Ironically, the living/dead distinction was given up in the Aufbau. Apparently, Carnap no longer considered it necessary to respond slavishly to all requirements of Lebensphilosophie.
10 Das ist der Keim zur Konstitutionstheorie des "Log. Aufbau"! 11 An exception is Tennant (1987) , who quotes an entire passage from Chaos but without interpreting it.
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The Chaos manuscript is a promising field for speculations concerning influences because the author made no effort to comply with the usual academic requirements of providing references, quotes, or sources. For instance, one may speculate that
Husserl's phenomenology may also have influenced its content (cf. Mayer (1992) , Rosado Haddock (2008)).
The central theme of Chaos is a sketch of the constitution of an epistemically ordered world ("Wirklichkeit") from an epistemic Chaos of Erlebnisse. This constitution is not meant to be a realistic description of what really happened in the cognitive history of the individual or the species. It is a "fiction" in the sense of Vaihinger. It can be seen as an extrapolation of the more common situation that arises when we are confronted with discrepancies between our cognitive expectations and experiences. In a Nietzschean vein, Carnap described it as follows:
The will to achieve a new order and to eliminate the gross inconsistencies is what gives rise to the epistemological considerations and the fictions that appear in them such as the chaos as a point of departure and the order principles according to which the (ordering) process develops.
This will to overcome the inconsistencies of reality by reconstructing it is also the irrational starting point of our theory. (Chaos, 1, emphasis mine,
This echoes Rickert, who in System and Die Lebensphilosophie asserted:
... [T]he will for the philosophical consideration of the world … is necessarily connected with the "will to the system". 13 (System, 10, emphasis and translation mine, TM)
Philosophy has to think the world in such a way that from the chaos of
Erlebnisse a Kosmos arises that is ordered and articulated by principles.
14 (System, 50, translation mine). fallen into almost complete obscurity as a philosopher, and, in particular, as a possible influence on Carnap. 16 He considered himself a "critical positivist" in the line of Mach and Avenarius. According to him, it was of outmost importance for a scientifically acceptable epistemology to begin with the "given" without smuggling in hidden assumptions that relied on linguistic or conceptual suggestions of the vocabulary used.
To avoid succumbing to the various conceptual temptations that may arise from conceptual associations of vocabulary, he expressed his account in quite artificial technical terms. For Ziehen, the directly given basis of epistemology was a class of "gignomena". In psychological language, which Ziehen was at pains to avoid at the beginning of his system, a "gignomenon" was something like a sensation (Empfindung) or, in a slightly different interpretation, an idea (Vorstellung). Ziehen preferred to avoid these highly charged concepts. Instead, he chose to maintain a strictly "neutral" language that could serve as a perfect mirror of the immediately given, namely the gignomena. The counterparts of the Aufbau's Erlebnisse do not suffice, however, to build an epistemology that deserves this name:
After having accepted the gignomena as a matter of fact, epistemology has the task to classify and order them. For this purpose, the principle of classification has to be clearly stated and justified. In particular, the 14 introduction of a hypothesis -for instance the hypothesis of an cognizing ego or something like that -has to be avoided. The classification has to be only an ordered description. (Ziehen 1913, 3, 4) The central question then becomes: according to what principles is the "ordered description" of the gignomena to be carried out? Ziehen, driven by his positivist conviction not to rely on any "subjective" order for ordering the gignomena, insisted that only the most austere principle for an "ordered description" of gignomena was to be used:
The principle of classification is only one -that of difference and similarity.
The idea of difference, equality, and similarity, respectively is, leaving aside spatial and temporal relations, which cannot be used for classificatory purposes, …the only general and original relation. (Ziehen 1913, 3 -4) .
According to Ziehen, therefore, not only the basic elements -the gignomena -but also the basic relation between them -the similarity relation between gignomenabelonged to the given. In other words, Ziehen subscribed to a type of structural realism according to which the basis of the "system of the world" was the class of gignomena endowed with a similarity relation.
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From this basic level of gignomena cum similarity relation, higher order objects could be constructed as Koinaden of gignomena. In other words, classes of similar gignomena, then Koinaden of Koinaden of gignomena, and so on. Carnap was later to explain this hierarchy more clearly in Chaos and in the Aufbau. Ziehen was content to illustrate the process of constitution with the following intuitive example. Consider a checkerboard, with white and black squares. A single square is constituted as a class of similar gignomena, their similarity given by the fact that they all have the color black, say. In
Ziehen's terminology, such a similarity class is a "Koinade", more precisely, a Koinade of the first order. The checkerboard itself is characterized as a Koinade of second order because all its squares are more similar to each other than they are to the gignomena that occurred in their neighborhood (cf. Ziehen (1913, 16f) .
17 By contrast, Carnap, in the Aufbau, subscribed to a mixed pedigree of the basic ingredients of his constitutional system. According to him, the basic elements -Elementarerlebnisse -were contributed by positivism, and the basic relation -Ähnlichkeitserinnerung -was a contribution of "transcendental idealism" (cf. Aufbau § 75). For Ziehen, both the elements and the basic relation of similarity belong to the "given".
Ziehen did not invest much effort in giving a precise description of this constitution process. He was content to note the importance of his "Koinadenprinzip" in general terms. According to Ziehen, the objects of the world were to be constituted by a single The most important translation is the "main similarity relation" ("Hauptgleichheit") G.
The binary relation G is to be reflexive and symmetric but not necessarily transitive. In psychological language, the state of affairs Gab between two building blocks a and b obtains if and only if they are similar with respect to (at least) one sensational aspect, for instance, if a and b share the same shadow of blue in the visual field or the same sound in the acoustic field. In Chaos, Carnap was already well aware that the Erlebnisse a and b, and b and c, respectively, may belong to the field of G. That is, Gab and Gbc may obtain, but Gbc does not, since a and c do not share a common aspect that renders them similar.
The relation G enabled the fictitious Aufbauer to constitute so-called quality classes as elements of the next higher level of the constitutional system: A class q of building blocks is a quality class if and only if it satisfies the following two conditions: any two elements of q stand in the relation G to each other; every building block that stands in relation G to all elements of G, also belongs to q. This is exactly the same definition of the quasi-analytical constitution of quality classes that later was to appear in the Aufbau.
The most important novel feature of Ziehen's account is to conceive "higher order"
entities as constituted as classes of similar gignomena; these classes are called "Koinaden" (from the Greek "koinos" = "common"). In Chaos, Koinaden are renamed "quality classes", and they are defined as maximal classes of similar Erlebnisse. Already, Ziehen had recognized that to avoid an infinite regress of gignomena, properties of gignomena, properties of properties of gignomena, and so on, one had to take the similarity concept as a primitive relational concept. That is to say, similarity was not explained further by referring to properties that similar gignomena had in common. This idea of conceiving similarity as a basic relational primitive is the core of the quasianalytical constitution method. He took similarity as a primitive relational concept in the sense that two gignomena a and b are similar or they are not similar. At the beginning of the process of constitution there are no properties of gignomena that may serve as "carriers" of the similarity relation in that gignomena are similar if and only if they have a property in common.
Carnap renamed Ziehen's "Koinaden" "quality classes" and defined them precisely as maximal similarity classes. 18 If the underlying similarity relation happens to be a transitive relation, then the resulting maximal classes are just equivalence classes.
Thus, Ziehen's "Koinadenprinzip" of constituting (maximal) classes of similar gignomena, classes of classes of similar gignomena, and so on, may be understood as a generalization of the Frege-Whitehead method of constitution by equivalence classes.
The following lengthy quote demonstrates that the basic idea of quasi-analysis was already present in Chaos:
We have disassembled the present experience in components due to the distinctions between "living vs. dead" and "finished vs. unfinished". We will call these components … building blocks (Bausteine) because they are used for the construction (Aufbau) (of Wirklichkeit). We don't go further in the process of dismantling the present experience. Rather, we consider the building blocks as indivisible totalities, although they comprise everything that the later abstraction distinguishes as the seen, the heard, and so on, and also as the partial sounds of a tone, the color spots of a visual field and so on. We too have to arrive at these concepts, but rather than doing so by analysis, we do so by synthesis (Aufbau). For us, they are not parts of building blocks but classes of them that are constituted by certain relations that exist between the building blocks (Emphasis mine, TM).
In the Aufbau, this general schema of constitutional theory is simplified considerably and simultaneously elaborated in detail for the simplest remaining case. The "basic building blocks" are restricted to Elementarerlebnisse, and there is only one similarity relation. The objects of the next level are certain subsets of Elementarerlebnisse or similarity classes. Because the objects of this level are sets, a natural similarity relation can be defined by stipulating that two sets of Elementarerlebnisse are similar if and only if they have a non-trivial intersection. Obviously, this can be iterated, thereby enabling quasi-analytical constitutions on all levels.
Ziehen was content to invoke a general "Koinadenprinzip", according to which higher order objects were constituted from lower ones as "Koinaden" of similar elements whereby the underlying similarity relation was "somehow" defined by taking into account certain unspecified "continuities" and "discontinuities". Carnap, however, offered an apparently much more precise account of quasi-analytical constitution. In fact, he carried out only the constitution of the first (next to base) level in terms of relational logic. Then, he fobbed off the reader by noting that he was only interested in giving a sketch of how constitution might work and not in working out detailed chains of constitution. With respect to full-fledged constitutions of higher order objects, the reader is not much better off with the Aufbau than with Ziehen's Erkenntnistheorie.
In the part of Carnap's Intellectual Autography in which he addresses the origins of the method of quasi-analysis, Ziehen is not mentioned. In the Aufbau, Carnap addresses only the simplified version of the method rather than the more complex version that he had developed in the Ur-Aufbau:
I developed a method called "quasi-analysis", which leads, on the basis of the similarity-relation among experiences, to the logical construction of those entities which are usually conceived as components… (Carnap 1963, Autobiography, 16 -17) In the longer, unpublished account of the Intellectual Autobiography, one finds the following more detailed remarks on the origin of this method in 1922:
There was a heated debate on the question whether a momentary experi- the true interest in the Aufbau lies not in the example of a constitution system it offers but in the set of formal procedures that it is the function of the example to illustrate. (Proust (1989, 185 ))
The most important of these "formal procedures" is certainly the quasi-analytical constitution method, although this is not generally recognized. For instance, Carus (2007) and Rosado Haddock (2009) do not mention the issue of quasi-analysis at all. This is certainly a loophole; in the opening paragraphs of the Aufbau, in which Carnap explained the aim of the work ("a constitutional system of concepts" ( §1)), the meaning of "constitution" ( §2), and the method to be employed ("the analysis of reality with the aid of the theory of relations" ( §3)) he left no doubt that he considered the issue of "method" to be of utmost importance. Moreover, he was convinced that the Aufbau would make an important contribution in this area:
[T]he reduction of "reality" to the "given" has in recent times been considered an important task and has been partially accomplished, for example, by Avenarius, Mach, Poincaré, Külpe, and especially by Ziehen and Driesch (to mention only a few names). The present study is an attempt to apply the theory of relations to the task of analyzing reality. (Aufbau, §3) This quotation exhibits an interesting strategy for emphasizing the importance and novelty of the Aufbau's method. First, quite a few predecessors are named, suggesting that many more could have been named. This process implicitly devalues and/or relativizes the philosophical originality and value of their work. All existing approaches are then characterized negatively as lacking an essential feature, which is, unsurprisingly, a strategy of Carnap's devising.
A closer look at Ziehen's Erkenntnistheorie reveals, however, that things are more complicated in the case of quasi-analysis. Ziehen is not simply a predecessor, he does offer a relational description via a basic similarity relation between the basic elements of his system (i.e. gignomena). What Ziehen's system is missing from a constitution system à la Aufbau is a precise characterization of the "Koinaden" as "quality classes", i.e., as maximal similarity classes with the help of relational logic.
Let us take stock and summarize the senses in which Chaos goes beyond Rickert's System, Ziehen's Erkenntnistheorie, and Russell's Our Knowledge of the External World:
• Rickert's vague proposal that the emergence of order is based on valuational principles is replaced by a more precise description of order generation by quasi-analytical constitution based on a similarity relation.
• Ziehen's conceptual apparatus is simplified and cast into a form that is suited to applying the calculus of relational logic. The vaguely-characterized Koinaden are replaced by precisely defined quality classes.
• Chaos goes beyond Russell's programs by applying the apparatus of relational logic in a concrete and specific way to similarity structures, instead of providing 20 only general programmatic recommendations.
IV. Values in the Aufbau.
In the preferred constitutional system of the Aufbau, the world is constituted as a structure consisting of four layers: autopsychogical, physical, heteropsychological, and cultural objects (cf. Aufbau, Summary, pp. 241/242). Most interpretations of the Aufbau have concentrated on the constitution of the autopsychological and the physical, whereas the higher layers of the heteropsychological and the cultural have generally been ignored. I do not feel this is justified. Even if the constitutions of the higher layers are sketchy, they shed interesting new light on the internal history of Carnap's Aufbau project. They demonstrate that at least in the beginning, the Aufbau project aimed at the constitution of a world that understood physical objects not only as logical constructs from sense data but also as cultural objects, thereby rendering it a meaningful world in a comprehensive sense.
Among so-called cultural objects, one find values in particular ( § 152). Although they belong to the fourth constitutional level of the system, their constitution is based on items belonging to the lowest level of the constitutional system, namely
Elementarerlebnisse of a special kind:
The construction of values from certain Erlebnisse, namely Werterlebnisse, Fundamentally, the difference between being and holding, of which so much has been made in recent philosophy, goes back to the difference between object spheres, more precisely, to the difference between proper objects and quasi objects. For, if a quasi object is constructed on the basis of certain elements, then it "holds" for these elements; thus, it is distinguished as something that holds from the elements which have being.
… Despite his dismissive attitude towards "the difference between being and holding, of In an almost Hegelian style, he then concluded that "construction theory explicated the logically strict form of the dialectic of the conceptual process" (ibid.).
In 1928, this interpretation of the quasi-analytical constitution as a kind of valuation in the style of Rickert was already on the verge of being abandoned, as evidenced by the "can be omitted" label on §42. However, around 1925, in an earlier phase of the Aufbau, "quasi-analyzing as valuating" was an integral part of the "logic of constitution forms". This is evidenced by the unpublished manuscript Entwurf einer Konstitutionstheorie der Erkenntnisgegenstände (Carnap 1925, RC 081-05-02) in which "Sein und
Gelten" appears as one among twelve sections of the chapter Die Logik der Konstitutionsformen.
The precarious situation of values in the later Aufbau project should not simply be interpreted as if Carnap was moving from a cognitivist to a non-cognitivist ethical standpoint. Rather, by denying them the status of objects of a constitutional system, Carnap denied values a rational status in a broader sense. Values were no longer considered worth of being explicated in a rational way.
Values were only one type of cultural object that originally belonged to the realm of objects constituted in the Aufbau. For the constitution of cultural objects such as habits, manners and similar manifestations of the "objective spirit", Carnap relied on Wilhelm Dilthey and, in particular, on Hans Freyer's Theorie des objektiven Geistes (Freyer 1923) . Indeed, Carnap's readiness to accept cultural objects (and possibly other types of objects, see §162 of the Aufbau) as an independent class of objects of constitutional systems shows that, at least for some time, he subscribed to a liberal ontological pluralism according to which the traditional dualism, which recognized physical and psychological objects, remained incomplete:
The philosophy of 19th century did not pay sufficient attention to the fact 23 that the cultural objects form an autonomous type. The reason for this is that epistemological and logical investigations tended to confine their attention predominantly to physics and psychology as paradigmatic subject matter areas. Only the more recent history of philosophy (since Dilthey) has called attention to the methodological and object-theoretical peculiarity of the area of cultural science. (Aufbau, §23)
The only, rather sketchy, example of the constitution of a "primary cultural object"
Carnap gives in the Aufbau is the constitution of the "custom of greeting through the lifting of one's hat" (cf. Aufbau § 150). This example and many of the concepts for describing the envisaged constitution of cultural objects were taken from Freyer's
Theorie des objektiven Geistes (Freyer 1923) (cf. 54 -55) .
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The project of the constitution of cultural objects was abandoned after 1928, although it is not clear why. One reason may be that the friendship between Carnap and Freyer dissolved in the late 1920s, most likely due to political differences. 21 Be that as it may, by 1932 the concept of "objective spirit" had changed for Carnap from a decent concept that could be constituted by the method of "manifestation" (as a variant of quasi-analysis) to a metaphysical pseudo-concept:
[Sciences such as sociology] often in their present form contain pseudoconcepts, viz. such as have no correct definition, and whose employment is based on no empirical criteria; … such (pseudo-)concepts cannot be reduced to the given, are therefore void of sense. Examples: "objective spirit", "the meaning of history", etc. (Carnap 1934, 73) Carnap never provided an argument for this thesis. One might speculate that he did not mean Freyer's "objective spirit" but its "obviously" metaphysical Hegelian namesake.
This interpretation is implausible, however, because Carnap took "objective spirit" as a 20 Freyer suggested a close parallelism between Carnap's Aufbau of the objective world of physical objects and the constitution of the objective world of cultural objects constituted in the course of history. He considered his account, which he described as a systematic "Kulturphilosophie" as a kind of complement to Dilthey's Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den
Geisteswissenschaften" (Freyer (1923, 10,11) ). Freyer literally aimed at a "structural theory of the Aufbau of the cultural world", i.e., a structural theory of the world of cultural objects (ibid.). The task of contributing to the improvement of life remained on the agenda of the Vienna Circle until its dissolution (cf. Romizi (2012)), although not even the most ardent partisans of Vienna logical empiricism can claim that it was overly successful in this endeavor. Does this mean that, all in all, the Aufbau program should also to be considered as a failure? I do not think so.
One of the best arguments for a more optimistic assessment remains the one put forward by Goodman long ago:
The Aufbau, for all its fragmentary character, and for all its defects, is still one of the fullest examples we have of the logical treatment of problems in non-mathematical philosophy. But its significance in the long run will be measured less by how far it goes than by how far it is superseded. … The Aufbau cannot yet, however, be relegated to the status of a monument having purely historical interest. Its lessons have not been fully enough learned. (Goodman 1963, 588) To me, the essential point of this argument is Goodman's insight that the Aufbau was one of the first (and fullest) "examples we have of the logical treatment of problems in non-mathematical philosophy". I would put the accent in a slightly different way by saying that the Aufbau offers some highly interesting examples of the mathematical treatment of non-mathematical problems in philosophy. To put it bluntly, the Aufbau is an early example of mathematical philosophy, i.e., an example of philosophy that employs qua philosophy methods (and results) of mathematics. A mathematical have still not been touched at all. Of course, there is then no question left, and just this is the answer." (Tractatus, 6.52) philosophy need not be per se a more scientific philosophy.
Contemporary interpretations of the Aufbau, however, usually shy away from the task of dealing in detail with the mathematical aspects of this work. According to many theorists, Goodman finished with the issue of quasi-analysis once and for all. There are few exceptions, such as Proust (1989) , Leitgeb (2008) , and Mormann (1994 Mormann ( , 2009 ).
Goodman's thesis invites us to reverse the perspective on "influences". Instead of considering influences as solely connections to the past, one may ask what influence the Aufbau may have on the future development of philosophy. Indeed, this may be the more interesting half of the task of determining the "influences" on a philosophical work. Arguably, the most promising candidate for such an influence on future philosophy is the quasi-analytical method, notwithstanding the fact that, for a long time, quasi-analysis was considered one of the Carnap's many ingenious projects that had been definitively shown not to work. The key witness for this claim was (and sometimes remains) Goodman's criticism of the method (Goodman, 1951 , chapter V).
Proust (1989) (Carnap 1923, RC-081-04-01) , a sophisticated version of quasi-analysis that overcame many of the allegedly insurmountable difficulties that Goodman, and other critics, had put forward. In pursuing the task of updating the quasi-analytical method, it is necessary to use formal means taken from a variety of mathematical theories. The resulting mathematical philosophy, modeled on Carnap, may differ considerably from traditional Carnap exegesis, but this need not be a disadvantage.
